Other such ciphers use this construction as attempts to improve the security of other ciphers (e.g., to improve the security of DES). In this paper we cryptanalyze Ladder-DES, a four-rounds Feistel cipher using DES in the round function, and show that its security is smaller than expected.
Introduction
Feistel ciphers are very common and well known. In particular, Feistel's construction is used in the Data Encryption Standard 8], Lucifer 12] and their many successors (such as Feal 11, 7] , GDES 10] , and many others). This construction was studied from the theoretical point of view by Luby and Racko 4] , who concluded that four rounds su ce to prove its security when the round function is random. Many suggested cryptosystems were designed with this construction, using another cipher as the round function: some examples are Bear and Lion 2], Beast 6] , and Ladder- DES 9] . Many other works had generalized or adopted the Feistel/Luby-Racko construction (some of them are 5,1]).
In this paper we cryptanalyze Ladder-DES, a four-round Feistel cipher, whose aim is to increase the security of DES, using DES in the round function. We describe the attack on Ladder-DES, and show that the security of Ladder-DES is smaller than expected. This attack can be generalized to many similar Feistel ciphers whose two parts (halves) are of the same size and whose round functions are permutations. This attack uses a novel application of the birthday paradox. 
A chosen Plaintext Attack
The main tool of the attack is the birthday paradox, which is used in a very unusual way. Usually the birthday paradox is used to nd a collision (two equal values) in a set of p n random values. Our attack uses the birthday paradox to identify whether given values are calculated by a pseudo-random function or a pseudo-random permutation. In the rst case, the birthday paradox predicts the existence of a collision given p n values. In the later case, collision cannot occur even given all the n values. In our attack the key is found only when we identify that there is no collision. This is the only use of the birthday paradox in this way which we are aware of.
In the attack we choose 2 36 plaintexts of the form (A,B) where B is your favorite (or random) 64-bit xed constant, and A gets 2 36 di erent 64-bit values.
In this context, L 1 is xed in all the 2 36 encryption runs, and L 0 gets 2 36 di erent values in the 2 36 encryption runs. for simplicity,we will call this property of L 0 a permutation (i.e., there is no collision; this property holds even in all the 2 64 possible plaintexts with a xed B). F 1 is L 1 encrypted under a xed (but unknown) key, thus it is xed in all the runs. A permutation XORed with a xed value is also a permutation, and thus L 2 is a permutation, and F 2 is also a permutation. L 1 is xed, and thus L 3 and F 3 are permutations as well. L 4 is not a permutation: it is a mix of two permutation, which behaves like a pseudo-random function.
Our aim is to nd the permutation in L 3 , given the ciphertext (C; D) = (L 4 ; L 5 ).
When the 2 36 ciphertexts are given, we try all the 2 56 possible keys k4, one by one, using the following algorithm: for some j < i) conclude that k4 is wrong, and try next k4 end for { We reach here only when k4 is the right key!! conclude that k4 is the key end for When we decrypt the ciphertext with a wrong candidate for k4, the one-round decryption function (that computes L 3 ) is expected to behave like a random function. For each candidate key we decrypt the fourth round of all the 2 36 ciphertexts, or till we get two equal values of L 3 . If two equal values of L 3 are found, L 3 is not a permutation, and thus the candidate for k4 is not the key. In average about 2 32 candidates are required to discard a wrong candidate. The real value of k4 does not imply any collision of L 3 even if all the 2 64 possible ciphertexts are decrypted by one round, and thus it can be identi ed.
Later, the values of k3 can be found with the same data, because L 2 is a permutation, but if a wrong value of k3 is used during decryption, the resultant value of L 2 would not be a permutation. A simpler method to nd k3 takes two of the plaintexts, compute the di erence of the output of F 3 as the XOR of the di erences of L 0 and of L 4 . Then, it searches exhaustively for the key k3 which satis es this di erence. False alarms can be identi ed and discarded using a third plaintext.
The remaining key k1 and k2 can then be found by exhaustive search, which would require only one plaintext/ciphertext sample, taken from the data we already have. Each of k1 and k2 would be found with complexity 2 56 , after k3 and k4 are known.
Some notes on the birthday paradox: About p 2 log e 2 2 64 = 1:177 2 32 2 32 random values are required to nd two equal 64-bit values with probability 1/2, and p 2 log e 2 2 64 m = p m 1:177 2 32 random values are required to nd such a pair with probability 1 ? 2 ?m . In particular, in the interesting case when m=56, and we have an error probability of 2 ?56 , we need only p 56 1:177 2 32 = 8:1 2 32 = 2 35 values to identify whether they are the result of a random function or a permutation. Thus given 2 35 ciphertexts we can identify the key almost without mistakes, and with 2 36 ciphertexts we can be almost ensured to have no mistakes (error probability about e ?128 = 2 ?185 , which causes probability 2 ?129 for a false alarm). In average we need only 2 32 trys, and only in a few cases we need more than 2 34 trys for a key (except for the real key).
Complexity:
We try 2 56 keys, for each we calculate in average 2 32 single DES's before we discard it. Thus our complexity is about 2 88 to nd k4. The complexity to nd k3 is 2 57 . k1 and k2 can then be found with complexity 2 56 each. Thus, the total complexity is about 2 88 . Only 2 35 {2 36 chosen plaintexts are required. This complexity is much less than the expected 2 112 complexity of a meet in the middle attack 3], which was claimed for this cryptosystem.
A Known Plaintext Attack
The complexity and number of required plaintexts of this known plaintext attack are about the same as of the chosen plaintext attack (2 90 complexity, 2 36 known plaintexts). The amount of required memory is however much larger than the chosen plaintext attack requires.
When the plaintexts/ciphertexts are given, we try all the 2 56 possible keys k4 one by one. For each k4 we search for collisions in L 3 as in the chosen ciphertext attack, but this time collisions should occur for all the keys. We keep the rst two collisions we nd (in lexicographic order of the index of the plaintexts) in a table (of size 2 2 56 , each keeps only the index of the pair). Similarly, we try all the values of k1 and search for collisions in F 3 (F 3 = A C DES K1 (B)). Clearly, a pair collides in L 3 i it collides in F 3 . We then search for pairs in the rst table which have the same indices as pairs in the second table: only such pairs can suggest the right k1 and k4. It is expected that only the right k1 and k4 will collide in two same pairs (average of 2 ?16 false alarms; additional safety margins can be added by keeping three colliding pairs in the tables, which reduces the rate of false alarms to 2 ?80 ).
The remaining k2 and k3 are easily found later with complexity 2 57 . This attack requires 2 36 known plaintext, 2 90 work (in average to nd the rst two colliding pairs for each key) and requires 2 57 space (about 2 60 {2 61 bytes).
